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This article looks into how media representations of North Korean defectors 
reproduce the images of North Korean defectors, while paying particular attention 
to the contrasting voices of North Korean defectors which reflect self-presentation. 
The media-perpetuated image of North Korean defectors as displaced victims 
whose memories are mostly clustered around the oppressive regime fails to grasp 
the intersection of aspiration, determination, and agency of North Korean defectors. 
The self-presentation of North Korean defectors reveals that they are eager to be 
in charge of constructing and controlling their own images, which goes beyond 
hitherto nationalized, gendered, and ethnicized identities. Self-presentation, at the 
same time, is a product of strategic choices conditioned by social discourse and 
media representation.
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Introduction
The number of the North Korean defectors residing in South Korea is 
approximately 34,000 as of the end of 2019, which is a rather small portion of 
the entire population of South Korea. Comparing this number to the number of 
international brides (1.6 million) and long-term foreign visitors living in South 
Korea (1.7 million) further demonstrates how few North Korean defectors there 
are in South Korea. Yet, the particular circumstance of political division between 
the two Koreas, the symbolic meaning of one nation, and the aspiration or 
expectation toward unification all add up to render North Korean defectors in 
South Korea as a group of significance. Most social attention on North Korean 
defectors is centered on adaptation and integration since they do not constitute a 
complete “other” to South Koreans.
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In addition to having no language barrier, North Korean defectors have a 
head start in that they are believed to share the alleged 5,000 years of Korean 
history and a priori Korean spirit with their fellow South Koreans. At the same 
time, it is noticeable that same language and cultural affinity between North 
Korean defectors and South Koreans does not always produce positive effects. 
Because of the presumed sharedness in historical experience and culture, North 
Korean defectors are considered qualitatively different from other groups of 
foreign origins, being regarded as an object for complete integration rather than 
that of effective adaptation (Choo 2006; Moon 2010; Choi 2012; Seo 2013). 
This perspective also enabled the assumption that South Korea would be the 
final and inarguably optimal destination for North Korean defectors. In this line 
of thought, the act of crossing borders and setting foot on South Korean territory 
is considered achieving the ultimate goal, making the next step to becoming a 
“normal” South Korean citizen full integration, if not complete assimilation. Most 
policies for North Korean defectors aiming at successful adaption and integration 
reflect this widespread assumption. As opposed to this view, however, the North 
Korean defectors are found not only in South Korea, but also in other Asian 
countries, North America, and Europe. Furthermore, the fact that most North 
Koreans living in countries other than South Korea are actually talnam North 
Korean defectors (meaning they again “escaped” from South Korea after having 
had resided for an extended period of time in South Korea after defection from 
North Korea) illuminates the crevice between the prevalent popular belief of 
South Koreans and the real situations of North Korean defectors (Park et al. 2011; 
Jun 2012; Lee and Lee 2014). 
The majority of South Korean people are well aware of the presence of North 
Korean defectors in South Korea due to media representation and government 
slogans, but very few of them have personal experiences of meeting them, not to 
mention having prolonged interactions in meaningful ways. Nonetheless, South 
Korean society seems to have a converging image of North Korean defectors 
which is constructed by media representation and policy discourses, while North 
Korean defectors secure few channels to have their voices heard.
With these particular circumstances in mind, this article asks the following 
questions: How much are North Korean defectors involved in the process of 
constructing their social images? How often do North Korean defectors have 
opportunities to have their voices heard? Are there existing differences between 
the dominant discourse on North Korean defectors and their self-presentation 
which reflect their motivations and intentions? If there is a gap between media 
representations and self-presentations, does it limit the capacity of North Korean 
defectors to live as legitimate citizens in South Korea?
Drawing on this, the following sections revisit the images and location of 
North Korean defectors in South Korean society by exploring how media represent 
them. A counter point is pursued by analyzing the content of interviews with 
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North Korean defectors focusing on their own ways of presenting themselves. 
This article also attempts to shed light on the ambivalent state of North Korean 
defectors who are rendered as neither citizens like us nor refugees like them 
(Chung 2008; Yoon 2015), and on the alternative ways for understanding North 
Korean defectors. As a pilot study rather than a fully completed research project, 
this article contains interviews with only a few North Korean defectors to 
illuminate the point.
Locating North Korean Defectors
Current scholarship on North Korean defectors can be roughly grouped into 
three categories for convenience of analysis, although there exist considerable 
overlapping areas between them. The first, which forms the majority, centers 
on the discourse of adaptation and social integration of North Korean defectors 
within South Korean society (Kim 2016; Cho and Han 2017; Lee and Choi 
2017; Seol and Song 2017; Kwon 2018). Literature in this category examines 
the state of as well as the multiple factors involved in the process of adaptation 
and integration, including South Koreans’ perceptions toward North Korean 
defectors (Kwon 2011; Sohn and Lee 2012; Yoo and Lee 2014). Studies in this line 
usually employ both quantitative (survey) and qualitative (interview) methods, 
although the latter is more often than not used as a complimentary measure to 
the former. Research on adaptation and social integration is closely related to 
policy implications, sometimes involving funding and commissioning by the 
government or government-related institutions. This is largely due to the fact 
that information and data on North Korean defectors are primarily collected and 
tightly managed by the government. Diverse voices of North Korean defectors 
are hard to detect in these studies since the focus on policy implications often 
presumes homogeneity among North Korean defectors. Studies on acculturation, 
on the other hand, exhibit more interest for individual cases (Yoon and Park 
2016).
While studies on adaptation and integration often approach North Korean 
defectors as part of a collectivity, the second group of research is keen to narratives 
generated by individuals. Given that the majority of North Korean defectors are 
women, it is not surprising that many studies pay attention to gender related 
issues in storytelling or memory-making processes on the part of North Korean 
defectors (Kim 2014; Cho 2015; Yang and Lee 2017). Along with women, 
psychology of the youth is another popular subject because young people, with 
their supposed malleability, are believed to best demonstrate the journey in which 
identity and perception of individuals undergo a series of change (Jung 2005; 
Baek and An 2016; Kim, Son, and Kim 2018). 
Research on identity politics forms a significant part in this category. 
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Identity formation, identity differentiation, identity transformation, and identity 
disorientations are among the popular subjects (Kang 2011; B. Lee 2014; Oh 
2016). Although stories and memories of individuals can add flesh to the skeleton 
of the policy-centered discourse aforementioned, questions on representation 
and generalization can be raised against personalized accounts of North 
Korean defectors’ experiences. Also problematic is that over-dramatized and 
sensationalized portrayals of the defection process might consolidate the image of 
North Korean defectors as victims.
A recent trend witnessed in scholarship on North Korean defectors is 
addressing North Korean defectors in the context of the transnational landscape 
and this forms the third category. Here, North Korean defectors are located beyond 
the insulated boundaries of nation-states to account for identity, psychology, 
adaptation, and so on (Han 2015; Chun 2018; Kang 2018). North Korean Diaspora 
(Park et al. 2011) is a seminal attempt published in the Korean language to shed 
light on the transnational aspect of the North Korean defector issue. In this co-
authored volume, the pull and push factors for North Korean defectors to relocate 
to different corners of the world are well explored. Shin’s (2019) study based 
on long-term fieldwork illustrates how North Korean defectors living in New 
Malden, United Kingdom expanded and renewed a sense of an “extra-territorial 
nation” through various interactions with South Koreans, other North Korean 
defectors, and foreigners. 
While studies actively engaging in the discourse of transnationalism certainly 
have opened a forum for investigating the North Korean defector issue on a global 
level, this approach has a limitation in that it assumes a solid linkage between 
geographical locations and a level of transnationality. For example, North Korean 
defectors are regarded as transnational only when they “escaped” from South 
Korea in pursuit of other destinations. The loophole is that those who still remain 
in South Korea for various reasons seldom get attention in research focused on 
transnationalism. Under this tacit assumption, transnationality primarily involves 
physicality of geopolitics rather than encompassing aspirations and worldviews of 
people.
The present scholarship on North Korean defectors mentioned above has 
produced literature which understands North Korean defectors as either an 
undifferentiated collectivity to draw out huge policy implications or as individuated 
testimonials with fragmented sentiments. Being lost in these approaches are 
intersections and dynamics between agency and structure, between collective 
identity and personal identity, between history and psychology. To go beyond this 
limitation, this article juxtaposes analysis of the collective image of North Korean 
defectors made by South Korean media and that of the interviews with individuals 
North Korean. By so doing, not only the gap between media representation 
and self-presentation on North Korean defectors, but also “the third space” for 
addressing North Korean defectors can be articulated (Bhabha 2004). 
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Ambiguous Status of the North Korean Defectors: Legal, Cultural, 
and Social Considerations
North Korean defectors have an ambiguous status on multiple levels. Article 
III of the South Korean Constitution declares that the Korean Peninsula and 
all the belonging islands are the territories of South Korea, which renders in 
principle the residents of North Korea as South Korean nationals. In 1997, the 
Law on the Protection and Settlement Support of the North Korean Defectors 
was implemented. This law defines North Korean defectors as someone having 
residential addresses, direct families, spouses, and jobs north of the Military 
Demarcation Line who defected from North Korea and not having acquired 
other nationality (Republic of Korea 1997). Hence, constitutionally and legally 
speaking, North Korean defectors have no problem obtaining Korean citizenship 
as long as the individual has not acquired other nationality previously. Unlike 
other foreigners, North Korean defectors instantly obtain South Korean citizenship 
without going through the naturalization process. 
Although the South Korean Constitution does not acknowledge North Korea 
as a nation de jure, when it comes to international law, North Korea is a de facto 
nation that practically rules over its territory. Under this, North Korean residents 
are entitled to the status of quasi-foreigners. When they defect from North Korea, 
they acquire the status of mandate refugee according to the protocols of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). However, the acknowledge- 
ment by the UNHCR regulations do not legally bind individual nation-states, as 
seen in the case of China where North Korean defectors are considered illegal 
immigrants, not refugees, and thus subject to deportation to North Korea. In 
sum, North Korean defectors go through a series of different statuses—North 
Korean citizens, mandate refugees, and South Korean citizens—during the 
process of defection. The South Korean government’s recent decision to send 
two North Korean fishermen (allegedly defectors) back to North Korea raised a 
huge controversy and shed light on the ambiguous legal status of North Korean 
defectors which is full of room for different interpretations (Lee 2019). 
Although North Korean defectors obtain South Korean citizenship 
and the related legality on arrival, they are clearly distinguished from South 
Korean residents. On arriving in South Korea, North Korean defectors remain 
in settlement adjustment centers (Hanawon) where they go through various 
programs promoting adaptation on political, economic, and social levels. Once 
they leave the center upon completion of the program, they become recipients 
of governmental welfare policies mandated by the Law on the North Korean 
Defectors which is firmly based on the discourse of integration. In fact, negative 
attitudes toward North Korean defectors often emerged from the question of 
fairness over the financial support and privileges granted them. Along with the 
settlement money from the government which is mandated by the Law on the 
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North Korean Defectors, support for housing, job training, employment, and 
university admission is seen as “unfair,” especially in the highly competitive South 
Korean society, and sometimes becomes a source of negative opinions toward 
North Korean defectors (Chun 2019, 96-98). 
Socially, North Korean defectors still occupy an ambivalent position that 
clearly indicates the gap between reality and principle. Although many South 
Korean people express favorable sentiments toward North Koreans based on the 
discourse of “one ethnicity of five thousand years,” when they find North Korean 
defectors in their neighborhood, very different attitudes are revealed.1 In other 
words, although South Korean people exhibit generous and inclusive attitudes for 
the abstract and unknown category of North Koreans as members of the same 
ethnic group, they are hesitant to share everyday life with them since they can 
pose a threat in “unfair” competitions given the many privileges entitled to them 
(Yoon and Song 2013). According to the Unification Perception Survey published 
by the Institute for Peace and Unification Studies (IPUS) at Seoul National 
University, although South Koreans consider North Korean defectors closer 
than either Ethnic Korean-Chinese or South Asians, when it comes to thinking 
of them as co-workers or future spouses, South Koreans express their intention 
to clearly set a certain social distance from North Korean defectors (Jung et al. 
2019a).
Almost Like Us, But Not Quite: Media Representation of North 
Korean Defectors 
While North Koreans are assumed to have “blood” relations as members of the 
same Korean ethnicity (hanminjok), at the same time, they are considered to 
be members of an enemy state in light of the division of the Korean Peninsula 
(see Lankov 2006). In other words, North Koreans are considered and treated 
sometimes as long-lost brothers, and at other times as evil twins depending on 
the focus of the circumstances. When it comes to North Korean defectors in 
South Korea, this ambivalence is all the more pronounced. While North Koreans 
are someone you need to live with in the undefined future, hence more abstract 
and generous attitudes are made possible toward them, North Korean defectors 
are also someone already here living with you, whose differences are considered 
uncomfortable and even disturbing. 
For most South Koreans, encountering “real” North Korean defectors is 
only made possible through entertainment or current affairs television programs. 
In programs on current affairs, North Korean defectors appear as previous 
insiders of North Korea testifying on the horrible state of the secluded society, 
covering such topics as politics, human rights, and the dire economic situation. 
Entertainment shows provide more gender-skewed perspectives by giving 
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the stage to young and attractive, mainly female, North Korean defectors and 
allowing them to talk about the lifestyle, customs, and popular culture of North 
Korea. In these shows, North Korean life is depicted as strange and outdated 
against the backdrop of South Korean life. When North Korean defectors 
introduce values, traditions, or habits that they had in North Korea in the media, 
the more strange they sound the more attention they get (Kang et al. 2017). Since 
something similar to South Korean lifestyle is not a good candidate for media 
attention, more dramatic and extreme cases are encouraged to get media hype 
(Oh 2016). While portraying North Korean culture and society this way, as Sun-
Min Lee (2014) argued, female North Korea defectors are consumed not just as 
political defectors but also second class citizens in South Korea. The image of 
young and attractive North Korean women is rendered as exotic beauty through 
such media representation.
Media representation of North Korean defectors struggles with the same 
ambivalence South Koreans have toward them: although the primary focus 
is on showing the audience the contrasting difference between North Korean 
defectors and South Koreans in terms of lifestyle and customs, the belief in 
ethnic commonality also needs to be addressed reflecting the political and social 
needs within South Korea. To solve this cul-de-sac, one strategy is to define the 
North Korean lifestyle as behind that of South Korea by a couple of decades. In 
other words, even though contemporary North Korean culture appears to be 
strange to us, it might be possible to ring in with the old lifestyle and habits of our 
predecessors. This narrative assumes some level of similarity, but only in different 
time frames (Chun 2015, 288-89).
Placing the object of representation within a historically different time than 
our own is a very efficient strategy of othering the object. It does not reject the 
similarity, but only does so in a safe way. Johannes Fabian’s (1983) concept of 
“denial of coevalness” finds its usefulness in this context. Fabian originally made 
the argument in the context of anthropologists and fieldwork. Once returning 
from the field, anthropologists write about their subject people often in such 
ways that the latter is placed in another temporal frame than the former’s. This 
way of distancing, which Fabian called “denial of coevalness” has an effect 
of smudging political context and negating the historical importance of the 
anthropologist’s experience. Representation of North Korean defectors achieved 
by South Korean media strongly resonates with Fabian’s critique in that it also 
reveals power relations at play among groups of people with different political, 
social, and cultural assets to solidify the boundary and to block critical awareness. 
In the following section, I examine how the image of North Korean defectors are 
perpetuated with three keywords that are often used to describe them.
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Defining North Korean Defectors in Social Discourses: Built-In 
Border Fence
A level of consistency is detected in the way in which North Korean defectors 
are represented in South Korean society. Examining media representations of 
North Korean defectors in South Korean society reveals that, to make a huge 
and non-differentiating lump image of North Korean defectors out of people 
with various backgrounds and experiences, the following key words are liberally 
used: “displaced” status is emphasized to signify uprootedness of North Korean 
defectors; “community” is made important to understand the social nature of 
North Korean defectors; and “nationality” gets attention to measure the level of 
integration of North Korean defectors to South Korean society.
Displaced
As seen in the official title of North Korean defectors employed in South Korea, 
these people are understood as someone who “defected” from the place where 
they were born and raised. On the surface, there seems to be no problem in 
naming them in this way, sounding factual enough. However, the primary 
focus on “defecting” accentuates their state of “being displaced.” Regardless that 
North Korean defectors either settle successfully in South Korea or defect again 
from South Korea in search of a better place in North America and Europe, the 
primary marker for North Korean defectors is firmly imprinted on the state of 
being “displaced.” 
The focus on displacement, in turn, provides a platform for adding negative 
aspects North Korean defectors might have: because they are displaced, they are 
unfamiliar with the new place, and this legitimizes negative qualifications such 
as incapability, sense of loneliness, inadaptability, and mental instability. It might 
be true that information on home is helpful when you are to understand other 
people, but essentializing a particular group based on their place of origin is a 
different matter. The problem with focusing on displacement is that it renders 
North Korean defectors passive victims of socio-politico-economic factors that 
forced them to leave, while little attention is paid to the motivation, intention, 
planning, calculation, and sentiments before, during, and after the defection. 
Community
The communities related to North Korean defectors can be divided into two 
categories: ones before the defection, the others after the defection. The former 
includes communities based on familial ties, occupation, and regions with which 
they were affiliated in North Korea. The latter includes broker and religious 
groups that helped in the defection process, North Korean defector-based com- 
munities, and settlement center alumni communities. Media representations 
depict communities before defection more or less in a negative light to emphasize 
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the distressing condition of North Korea and hence to legitimize the supremacy 
of South Korea. On the other hand, the communities after defection are portrayed 
in a relatively positive way focusing on their usefulness in accelerating the 
adaptation process. 
Both cases share the same principle: the communities are considered to exist 
outside the North Korean defectors, and these communities wield formidable 
power onto them. No communities are free from changes and modification 
brought by the intersecting intentions and acts of the members. However, in 
most media representation of North Korean defectors, communities appear 
to be fixed and non-changing, and their significance is measured by whether 
they have positive or negative effects on North Korean defectors. This way of 
rigid configuration hampers analyzing the flexibility of communities as well as 
understanding transient appropriation of the communities on the part of North 
Korean defectors. Defection and adaptation is a long and complex journey. 
Paying attention to the process by which the relationships among members are 
defined and utilized will open up a window for better understanding the issue of 
agency on the part of North Korean defectors.
Nationality
The phenomenon of refugees is considered as a product of modernity in that 
discourses and policies on refugees seem non-separable from the concept of 
nation. Discourses on refugees concern their long and painful journeys with a 
series of events—being born and raised in a certain country, getting persecuted or 
oppressed, then being relocated to another country to be segregated or accepted 
only as second-class citizens. 
Surveys on North Korean defectors often include questions on whether they 
identify as North Korean or South Korean. Sometimes it takes a euphemistic 
turn such as asking them which team they would root for in North-South Korea 
sports matches. Although these questions are designed to look into the self-
identification of North Korean defectors, it results in narrowing the field of 
national identity, fortifying the assumption that single-country belongingness at 
a given time is the norm. Criticizing the talnam phenomenon, a case in which 
North Korean defectors relocate to a third country after they spend some time 
settling in South Korea, as an act of betrayal is also in line with this perspective: 
if you dislike North Korea enough to leave for South Korea, then you should do 
whatever it takes to be a good citizen of South Korea. The widespread belief in 
patriotic sentiment to a single country as the norm even wraps this political idea 
with ethical concerns.
We can ask following questions in regard to this: how do North Korean 
defectors understand the single-nation-identity?; is it “normal” to have a sense of 
attachment only to a nation that provides one with a legal and institutional safe 
net?; is it legitimate to raise an ethical criticism for not having a sense of exclusive 
102 Kyung Hyo Chun
attachment to a single nation?; more fundamentally, how does one define one’s 
own nation? 
Enunciating the Self: Can North Korean Defectors Speak? 
Years back, Erving Goffman (1959) developed the theory of impression manage- 
ment using the metaphor of life as theatre. According to him, just like actors 
on stage, individuals make conscious and unconscious efforts in their everyday 
interactions to present acceptable images of themselves to others while concealing 
information that might be in conflict with the images they want to deliver. With 
his signature dramaturgical approaches, Goffman employed such concepts 
as front stage and back stage to illuminate individuals’ strategic choices and 
behaviors under different circumstances and audiences. Goffman’s theory is 
crucial in that it registers the roles both agency and structure play in everyday life.
His analysis is insightful for the purpose of this article in regard to addressing 
the discrepancy as well as intersection between media representation and self-
presentation of North Korean defectors. Interviews with North Korean defectors 
enable us to look into their own ideas and intentions which is clearly different 
from prevalent media representations. At the same time, it is noticeable that the 
interviewees’ stories are embedded with their intentions to present particular 
images—contrasting images to the widespread and negative representation of 
North Korean defectors—to the audience, the interviewer in this case.  
Interviews with North Korean Defectors 
As a pilot study, a total of four North Korean defectors were interviewed for 
this article and the number of interviewees are clearly not representative of the 
entire group of North Korean defectors in South Korea. On the contrary, the 
interviewees do not fit into the conventional category of North Koreans in terms 
of educational background, occupation, and social status. It is in fact considered a 
positive factor in seeking to pronounce some aspects that have been neglected or 
eschewed in the prevalent image of North Korean defectors. All four interviews 
were conducted as open-ended interviews, and the guidelines are as follow in 
Table 1.
Self-Presentation of North Korean Defectors: Findings and Analysis
In order not to disclose any private details of the interviewees, none of their 
personal information is revealed in the following section. Only their gender is 
acknowledged since all of them are female. In addition, no direct quotations of 
the interview content are presented here on specific request of the interviewees. 
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Without quotation marks, however, efforts were made by the interviewer to 
deliver stories as they were told. 
Interviews with North Korean defectors reveal that they have different foci 
from the media representation or policy discourse in presenting who they are and 
what they value. Throughout the interviews, the self-identification of interviewees 
was presented with the following points: desire to be acknowledged as fellow 
South Koreans, inclination to distance themselves from other North Korean 
defectors, willingness to take charge of their own lives, and everlasting longing for 
family reunion. 
Table 1. Guidelines for the Open-Ended Interview with North Korean Defectors
Basic Information Personal Age, gender, areas of residence in North Korea, 
occupation in North Korea, years of residence in 
South Korean, areas of residence in South Korea, 
current occupation in South Korea 
Defection 
Process




Family members remaining in North Korea; methods 
and frequency of contacting family members; method, 




How often, with whom, for what purpose, through 
what community
Opinions on Media 
Representation 
of North Korean 
Defectors in South 
Korea
TV shows, programs, and movies about North Korean defectors 
represented by South Koreans 
TV shows and programs where the actual North Korean defectors appear 
Satisfaction/dissatisfaction about the way in which North Korean 
defectors are represented, and why 
Comments or suggestions for improvement
Understanding 
Self-Presentation 
of North Korean 
Defectors
Communities or networks of the past and the present: types, purpose, 
participation rate, satisfaction/dissatisfaction
Self-identity in relation to North Korea, South Korea, and/or a third 
country (significance, attachment)
Attachment/meaning of North Korea and South Korea
Evaluation of the experience of defecting from North Korea and living in 
South Korea 
Chance of returning to North Korea (when, under what condition, 
reasons)
Country of residence for your children in the future 
Source: Author
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Identity as North Korean 
When it comes to theory of identity, this article assumes the postmodern 
approach. Unlike the essentialist discourse which argues that identity has an 
unchanging and everlasting quality deep down in the unconsciousness, the 
postmodern approach to identity is based on constructionist views (Cerulo 1997, 
31-93; Schachter 2005, 140-41). The postmodern tradition in identity theory 
has several branches depending on their emphasis on roles, performances, 
and power of knowledge, but they all agree that an individual is able to have 
multiple identities which are changed, contested, negotiated, appropriated, and 
manipulated depending on the circumstances and motivations. 
When asking the interviewees to assess the percentage of their identity as 
North Korean defectors among various other identities that form an ego, all 
responded with a very low ratio, ranging between 5 and 10 percent. According 
to the annual survey conducted by IPUS on North Korean defectors, around 
80 percent of the total respondents identified themselves as South Koreans 
rather than North Koreans (Jung et al. 2019b). Of course there are differences 
in question framing in that the IPUS’s survey made the interviewees choose 
between North Korea or South Korea while this research asked for a percentage 
of significance of being a North Korean defector in forming the multi-layered 
identity for an ego. 
It is noticeable that the stigmatic label of “North Korean defector” seems 
undying through the life of an individual. For example, even if someone defected 
from North Korea twenty years ago and has lived as a good South Korean tax payer 
for twenty years, society nevertheless sees the person as a North Korean defector, 
distinguished from born-to-be South Koreans. The low rate of identifying as a 
North Korean defector in the self-presentation of four interviewees, including 
one who has been in South Korea for only about one year, shows a huge contrast 
with the social perspective. When asked to elaborate on the reason for their low 
attachment to their North Korean origins, they said that since they were so busy 
adapting to South Korean society to become South Koreans, they do not have the 
luxury of considering themselves as someone other than South Korean. 
Of course, there exists a crevice between such self-presentation and media 
representation, and this may in turn be a negative factor in confusing North 
Korean defectors’ own identification. One of the interviewees told me that even 
though she does not consider herself a North Korean defector anymore, once 
people around her learn that she is from North Korea, their attitudes seem to be 
instantly affected by the fact. In turn, she feels discriminated against and isolated 
by such responses when she acknowledges the label of North Korean defectors 
attached to her, making it all the more salient, even though she herself refused to 
accept it as her major identity. 
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Community and Social Network 
It is clear that self-presentation or self-identification is not always consistent with 
the actual behavior of an individual. For instance, when asked how much they 
were involved with other North Korean defectors and received useful information 
from such networks, all interviewees replied none or minimal. However, when 
combining bits of stories here and there over the course of the entire interview 
session, it was obvious that they were having a considerable amount of interaction 
with other defectors and receiving significant amounts of useful information they 
trusted from their networks. 
Then why do they minimize the real interaction in their direct and conscious 
self-presentation? It seems that they are very aware of how they are perceived 
by the interviewer (or other people) when they are seen as close to other North 
Korean defectors. As with the previous questions of rating their identity as North 
Korean defectors, the interviewees were keen to draw a line between them and 
other defectors to present themselves as South Koreans rather than someone from 
North Korea. When asked which community or group is most helpful or useful 
in their life, all interviewees pointed out occupational or professional groups that 
they were affiliated with in South Korea. This shows some consistency with the 
previous question in that they attempt to measure and manage the social distance 
from other North Korean defectors and thus manage the possible impression 
which may arise therein. 
From an anthropological perspective, judging the factuality of the response 
is not of primary interest here. Rather, examining how the interviewees intend to 
interpret their images to others is more significant. For example, when tracking 
down the source of useful information the interviewee collected, it turned 
out to be from fellow North Korean defectors, although the interviewee said 
a few minutes ago that she was not in much contact with other North Korean 
defectors. In this case, the interviewee explained that the friends who shared the 
information happened to be North Korean defectors, but that does not mean that 
she deliberately built a relationship with North Korean defectors. Like this, all 
four interviewees sought to maximize their distance from other defectors, and 
this conscious self-presentation reflects a strong aspiration to control their own 
images which is different from the conventional image of North Korean defectors 
perpetuated by the media. 
Agency in Making Selections and Decisions
Another contrasting point between media representation and self-presentation 
is the agency on the part of North Korean defectors. One of the key words that 
configures media representation of North Korean defectors is “passiveness.” They 
are depicted as victims of political oppression, social control, and economic 
deprivation while in North Korea. With these images, North Korean defectors 
are considered people who escaped from North Korea due to insurmountable 
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hardships and had no other option. They are recipients of government support 
following the beginning of a new life in South Korea. Thus, when they seem 
not to be successfully adapting to South Korea, society focuses on what kind of 
help was insufficient, not giving much attention to the North Korean defectors 
themselves. In both cases, the outer factors are measured as significant, rendering 
North Korean defectors as either victims or recipients.
The content of the interviews indicated, however, that the process of defection 
required a considerable amount of planning, determination, decision making, and 
compromises. In contrast to popular ideas, defection is not something improvised 
but a complex and deliberate process of information exchange among multiple 
players. The exchange of information is not balanced, of course, placing North 
Korean defectors in a very unfavorable position with a high risk of having their 
plans thwarted. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the interviewees described 
the process and the aftermath of defection as results of their own decisions, and 
they were eager to be in charge of the situation, be it positive or negative (see also 
Yoon 2012). 
The agency of the North Korean defector matters not only before and 
right after the defection, but also when it comes to the ultimate purpose of the 
defection. One of the echoing stories during the four interview sessions is that 
they came to South Korea not because they were starved and poor in North 
Korea but because they expected better opportunities and a brighter future in 
South Korea. One of the interviewees said that she might have lived an okay life 
in North Korea if she did not leave for South Korea. She added that she did not 
regret her decision though, because she still believed she would have a better 
future in South Korea. 
Another interviewee confessed that she lived quite an affluent life in North 
Korea, but she decided to come to South Korea nonetheless since she longed for 
freedom. With freedom in making choices for her own life denied, it was not 
worth living, she said. She added that for her it was not political oppression or 
economic difficulties but a desire for personal independence that fueled her 
decision to leave North Korea. Here, in contrast to the media representation and 
dominant discourse that depict the North Korean defectors as victims and passive 
recipients, the interviewees considered themselves as active agents for their own 
life, being eager to take charge of the situation. 
Family and Diaspora 
One of the themes penetrating the past, present, and future of North Korean 
defectors appears to be family. When asked about an emotional attachment or 
the psychological distance to North Korea, challenges, and future plans in South 
Korea, and the possibility of a future visit/return to North Korea, all responses 
converged into the keyword of “family.” The sense of attachment to North Korea 
might come from fond childhood memories, but a more fundamental factor 
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lay in the fact that North Korea is where their loved ones are. The most difficult 
challenges in South Korean life include the absence of family and the concern 
about the wellbeing of family members remaining in North Korea. The only 
reason to visit North Korea in the future is also to reunite with their families. 
Two of the four interviewees were cases of “chain defection,” in which some 
family members were already settled in South Korea before the defection. These 
family members helped the interviewees come to South Korea with information 
on brokers and money through remittance. Even in these cases, the interviewees 
expressed their hopes or plans to bring other family members to South Korea in 
the future. Three of four interviewees said they were sending money to North 
Korean family members and were in contact with them on a regular basis via 
phone calls. The one who is not currently sending money to North Korea also 
said she planned to start the remittance once she found a better paying job. 
Considering the images of North Korean society and family dynamics 
acquired through South Korean education on and media depiction of North 
Korea, one might think the kind of family relationship familiar to us is non-
existent in North Korea: it is a highly controlled society where the political 
party overrules the traditional family relationship, and individuals are trained to 
watch their own family members to maintain the socialist order. The interviews, 
however, show that the emotional importance placed on family is similar between 
the two Koreas. Furthermore, the North Korean defectors considered themselves 
in a similar vein with families who were separated by the Korean War (isangajok). 
Just like the separated families who cannot be with their loved ones due to the 
division of the Korean Peninsula, North Korean defectors, too, are suffering due 
to the hostile political circumstances between the two Koreas. 
Conclusion: Identity, Self-Presentation, and Society
The number of North Korean defectors is a small fraction of the entire population 
of South Korea, and few South Koreans actually interact with North Korean 
defectors in their everyday lives. Nevertheless, people seem to share a certain 
image of North Korean defectors that have been represented and reproduced by 
the media. Criticisms of the television programs where North Korean defectors 
testify about the abysmal state of North Korean life and oppressive political 
regime are related to the perpetuation of negative images of North Korea. 
Circulating incorrect or exaggerated information on North Korean society is 
problematic considering the inter-Korean relationship and future unification. Just 
as problematic, although few people seem to care, is the social image of North 
Korean defectors portrayed by such programs. 
Media representation of North Korean defectors in South Korea disseminates 
the following images: people who suffered from political oppression and 
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economic poverty under a dehumanizing regime, people distinguished from 
South Koreans due to different lifestyles and value systems, people making a 
living by blaming their place of origin using incorrect information or exaggerated 
stories, and people earning fame by rejecting and tainting their past. While these 
images are reproduced and perpetuated, news on dire incidents, such as those 
who committed suicide after losing lots of money to scams or a family suffering 
a tragic end after an unsuccessful adaptation, become another path for South 
Koreans to realize the existence of North Korean defectors. 
Real life for the 34,000 North Korean defectors can be found somewhere 
between the dramatized images and extreme tragedies. Unnoticeable they might 
be, they are still managing everyday life by struggling between the familiar and 
the new, different systems, values, and expressions. What this article attempts 
to show is that their own images, their self-presentation can be far different 
from what media representation has been conveying to most South Koreans. 
The images of North Korean defectors might be more complex and multi-
layered than the society believes them to be. For sure, it is not to say that North 
Korean defectors’ self-presentation is closer to the reality per se. As Goffman’s 
analysis of everyday presentation of self stipulates, self-identification and related 
conversation and behavior is the product of strategic choices which in turn 
fashioned individual intention as well social structure. Hence, the point of this 
pilot study lies in calling for a more nuanced and multifaceted approach in 
addressing North Korean defectors’ lives in South Korea.
As mentioned in the beginning, this research is not an attempt to induce 
representability or generalizability of North Korean defectors as a whole. Rather, 
it has intended to reveal different angles than the hitherto circulated images of 
North Korean defectors by paying attention to their own self-images and voices, 
while keeping in mind that those self-presentations are also social constructs. The 
purpose of this article is limited in scope and scale for sure, but the effect does 
not necessarily have to be. As a pilot study on the identity and image of North 
Korean defectors, it awaits more active and productive discussions on the topic in 
the near future. 
Notes
1. Some scholars argue that popular belief in the idea of “one nation of Korean people” 
is not so much about fictive blood as it is about a long history and culture of the Korean 
people. See Han 2007, 19-22.
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